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THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION‘S DECISIONS TO
ENFORCE, BUT NOT DEFEND, DOMA § 3
Robert J. Delahunty*
On February 23, 2011, Attorney General Eric Holder advised Congress
that the Department of Justice (DOJ) would no longer defend § 3 of the
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)1—the Act of Congress that defines
―marriage‖ for federal purposes as ―a legal union between one man and one
woman as husband and wife.‖2 The Attorney General stated: ―[T]he
President and I have concluded that classifications based on sexual
orientation warrant heightened scrutiny and that, as applied to same-sex
couples legally married under state law, Section 3 of DOMA is
unconstitutional.‖3 The Attorney General noted that ―there is substantial
circuit court authority applying rational basis review to sexual-orientation
classifications.‖4 Furthermore, he acknowledged that the DOJ previously
defended § 3 in circuits that ultimately applied rational basis review to
classifications by sexual orientation.5 Nonetheless, in two pending
challenges to § 3 in the Second Circuit—which had not ruled on the
controlling standard of review—the President instructed the DOJ not to
defend the challenged section. The Attorney General added:
Notwithstanding this determination, the President has
informed me that Section 3 will continue to be enforced by
the Executive Branch. To that end, the President has
instructed Executive agencies to continue to comply with
Section 3 of DOMA, consistent with the Executive‘s
obligation to take care that the laws be faithfully executed,
unless and until Congress repeals Section 3 or the judicial
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branch renders a definitive verdict against the law‘s
constitutionality. This course of action respects the actions
of the prior Congress that enacted DOMA, and it
recognizes the judiciary as the final arbiter of the
constitutional claims raised.6
Obviously, the Obama Administration‘s decisions not to defend the
constitutionality of DOMA—but at the same time, to enforce it—raise
significant constitutional questions.
I. DOES THE EXECUTIVE HAVE 1) A DUTY NOT TO ENFORCE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTES, 2) A DISCRETIONARY POWER NOT TO
ENFORCE THEM, OR 3) A DUTY TO ENFORCE THEM?
Plainly, the Executive has no duty to enforce an unconstitutional
statute. The Executive is charged with the faithful execution of ―the law,‖
and an unconstitutional statute is not law.
The harder question is whether the Executive has a duty not to enforce
an unconstitutional statute, or the discretion to decide whether to enforce it
or not. Leading constitutional scholars have taken different positions on the
matter. Walter Dellinger, whose views the current DOJ appears to be
tracking, has maintained that the Executive has discretion not to enforce an
unconstitutional law, but not a duty not to do so.7 Sai Prakash, on the other
hand, argues that the Executive is duty-bound not to enforce an
unconstitutional law.8
Prakash‘s reasons, in brief, are these: First, an unconstitutional law is
simply void, and thus not ―law.‖ The President has no more a right to
enforce such a ―law‖ than he has to enforce the statute of a state or foreign
nation.9 Second, the President has taken an oath to preserve, protect and
defend the Constitution, and enforcing an unconstitutional law would
undercut that oath by subordinating it to an unconstitutional law.10 Third,
the Faithful Execution Clause and the Supremacy Clause, combined, also
require the President to follow the Constitution rather than unconstitutional
laws.11
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I believe that Prakash is correct. In addition to Prakash‘s powerful
textual and structural reasons, sound policy supports his claims. To assume
that the President has the ―discretion‖ to decide whether to enforce an
unconstitutional law or not is to expand the President‘s power in a way that
invites opportunism and irresponsibility. The President can pick and
choose among unconstitutional statutes and decide which of them to
execute—probably with an eye on his or her political fortunes. On the
other hand, holding that the President has an affirmative duty not to enforce
an unconstitutional law is to encourage a more disciplined and careful use
of executive power. Presidents will be required to make constitutionally
principled enforcement decisions regardless of their political effect.
Presidents will be forced to become more circumspect and reflective in
categorizing statutes as ―unconstitutional‖ when the practical consequences
of such a determination are inescapable.
II. IF THE EXECUTIVE HAS A DUTY NOT TO ENFORCE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL LAWS, IS IT NONETHELESS BOUND (OR AT LIBERTY)
TO DEFEND THEM IN CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION?
If a law is unconstitutional, the Executive has a duty not to enforce it.
Therefore, the Executive must not enforce it even if the courts uphold it.
The fact that the courts uphold a law as constitutional does not entail that it
is constitutional. Contrary to Cooper v. Aaron,12 the Constitution is not
necessarily what the Supreme Court says it is: the Constitution‘s meaning is
not the same as the interpretation of that meaning, even by high judicial
authority. Only on that understanding can we explain why the Court
itself—though less often than it should—has confessed error and overruled
mistaken constitutional precedents.
Because the Supreme Court‘s interpretation of the Constitution is not
necessarily correct, and also because the Executive is a co-equal branch
with its own sworn responsibility to uphold the Constitution, the Executive
has a duty to make its own, independent determination of a statute‘s
constitutionality. Executives in the past have respectfully disagreed with
the Supreme Court‘s views on the Constitution. True, in the most extreme
case, an irresoluble difference between the Supreme Court and the President
might lead to a constitutional impasse, possibly provoking a constitutional
crisis. But that kind of crisis has not happened in our country‘s history,
even in the dispute between the Supreme Court and President Nixon over
the disclosure of the Watergate tapes.13 The explanation probably is that
that the political costs to the President of a frontal assault on the Court have
usually been too high.
12
358 U.S. 1, 18–20 (1958) (asserting that ―the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment
enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is the supreme law of the land‖ under the Supremacy Clause)
(link).
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United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (link).
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If the Executive has a duty not to enforce an unconstitutional law even
if the courts uphold it, it follows that there is a practical reason for the
Executive not to defend an unconstitutional law from challenge. If the
Executive‘s defense is successful in persuading the courts, the Executive
will still be bound to disregard the courts‘ mistaken decision.
Furthermore, if the Executive defends a statute that is unconstitutional,
it increases the likelihood that the courts will heed that defense and sustain
the law—thus making it more likely that an unconstitutional law will be
treated as if it were constitutional, and raising the chances of an
unnecessary confrontation between the branches. This, again, supports the
proposition that if a law is unconstitutional, the Executive should not
defend it.
III. WHAT IF THE EXECUTIVE IS REASONABLY, BUT NOT COMPLETELY,
CERTAIN THAT A LAW IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
This of course is the normal situation. In nearly all realistic scenarios,
the Executive cannot and will not affirm categorically that a challenged
statute is unconstitutional—certainly not to the point of maintaining that it
will disregard even a Supreme Court ruling that upholds the law. The usual
situation is one in which the Executive will take the position that the statute,
by its best lights, is unconstitutional.
Does the Executive have a duty to enforce the law in that situation?
The analysis given thus far does not provide a conclusive answer because
there is a logical space between a law that is unconstitutional and a law that
the Executive reasonably believes to be unconstitutional. Just as the courts
may be in error about the constitutionality of a statute, so too may the
Executive be in error. And just as the Court may overrule a constitutional
precedent, a later occupant of the Presidency may also reverse (and correct)
a predecessor‘s view of a statute‘s constitutionality.
In Prakash‘s view, the risk that the President ―will make constitutional
errors in the course of deciding whether the Constitution permits him to
enforce particular statutes . . . hardly means that the President lacks a duty
to disregard statutes he regards as unconstitutional.‖14 There are at least two
ways to understand this view. One way has to do with higher-order beliefs
about beliefs. The other has to do with the degrees of certainty of
particular, first-order beliefs. Prakash might mean that the President‘s
general belief that some of his particular beliefs on the unconstitutionality
of statutes do not relieve him from the duty of acting on his belief about a
particular statute‘s unconstitutionality in a particular case. That is true. But
the more relevant question is whether a President‘s belief that a particular
statute is unconstitutional may not be so tempered by countervailing
arguments in favor of its constitutionality that he may be justified in
14
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defending it, at least for the purpose of seeking the views of courts and
opposing litigants. A mother might believe that her son is indeed guilty of a
crime, but nonetheless defend him because she expected that that conduct
would bring further evidence to light that bore on the truth of her belief.
When the Executive is uncertain, there are no bright-line constitutional
rules to guide its behavior. Instead there would seem to be, at best,
protocols that have ―constitutional underpinnings.‖15 The past practice of
the Executive branch—including the Executive‘s own self-conscious
reflections on that practice—provides some assistance in formulating those
protocols.
If the Executive is strongly convinced that a law is unconstitutional,
but not so convinced that it would decline to enforce the law even if the
Supreme Court sustained the law on what the Executive considered
adequate grounds, then the Executive should continue to enforce the law if
such enforcement is necessary to secure a judicial opinion on the subject of
the law’s constitutionality. Thus, the Executive should not moot out such a
case. The Executive may thereafter take the judiciary‘s opinions into
account (including concurring and dissenting opinions) when making its
own final, independent decision about enforcing the law. The courts‘
opinions may bring arguments to light that the Executive had not
considered before, or to which it had given insufficient weight. The
Executive may also give more weight to a unanimous decision than to a
badly split one. Listening to the views of the courts is a facet of a
reasonable process of error-avoidance that the Executive could justifiably
choose to follow in reaching its own, independent constitutional judgments.
The Supreme Court typically follows the same course by waiting for several
circuit courts to express opinions on a contentious constitutional question
before ultimately deciding it.
If, however, the litigation challenging the statute can go forward even
when the Executive discontinues enforcement (perhaps because
nonenforcement does not bring relief to litigants in pending cases), then the
Executive should cease to enforce the statute.
In most cases, therefore, it would seem that the Executive has a duty
not to enforce a statute that it finds unconstitutional. That duty would seem
even more binding when the Executive had a firm, reasoned conviction that
the statute was unconstitutional.
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See Banco Naçional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964) (―The act of state doctrine
does, however, have ‗constitutional‘ underpinnings.‖) (link). The judge-made act of state doctrine
derived from, although it was not impelled by, the constitutional allocation of authority between the
Executive and the courts in the sphere of foreign affairs. Here too, the appropriate guidelines for the
Executive‘s use of its power should be rooted in and serve basic constitutional policies and values, even
though the Constitution does not in itself dictate what those guidelines are.
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IV. WHAT ABOUT DEFENDING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
STATUTE IN THOSE SITUATIONS?
These conclusions do not yet reach the question of the Executive‘s
duty to defend what it reasonably believes to be an unconstitutional statute.
Could the Executive have a duty not to enforce such a statute but
nonetheless be at liberty to defend it against a constitutional challenge?
It seems reasonably clear that the Executive could have a duty not to
enforce what it determined to be an unconstitutional statute, and
nonetheless also have a right to defend that statute, in some limited
circumstances—if its defense of the statute were necessary to obtain a
judicial ruling on the statute‘s constitutionality, and the Executive
considered such a ruling advisable or important.16 But in many cases, the
Executive can cede the defense of a statute to other, capable hands (as has
happened in the litigation over § 3 and in other classic cases of
nondefense17). If the Executive‘s decision not to defend a statute does not
preclude the courts from considering and ruling on a reasoned and effective
defense of it, and if the Executive‘s nonenforcement of the statute does not
moot out all challenges or otherwise prevent cases from going forward, then
there would seem to be no reason why the Executive should not decline
both to enforce and to defend the statute.
In fact, the Executive‘s decision not to enforce a statute that it has
concluded it cannot defend is one test of the Executive‘s good faith in
claiming to find the statute unconstitutional. A declination to defend a
statute while still enforcing it will normally incur much lower political costs
for the Executive than a decision neither to defend nor to enforce it. A
nonenforcement decision typically has consequences that are immediately
visible to the public. Here, for instance, nonenforcement would mean that
same-sex couples married under state law could receive federal benefits
previously available only to heterosexual married couples. A decision not
to defend, in itself, carries much less political exposure for the Executive.
If the courts eventually strike down a statute that the Executive has enforced
but not defended, the Executive can deflect criticism for the statute‘s
subsequent nonenforcement onto the judiciary. If, on the other hand, the
courts uphold the statute, the Executive can mitigate any political damages
for not having defended it by continuing to enforce it.

16

A judicial ruling could be useful for the Executive in several ways. The court might strike the
statute down, thus confirming the Executive in its belief that the statute was unconstitutional. Or the
court might sustain the statute. The Executive, however, might find the court‘s reasoning so
unpersuasive that that result also confirmed its belief that the statute was unconstitutional. Finally, the
court might affirm the statute on grounds that the Executive, after reconsideration, found to be
persuasive.
17
See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (link).
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V. HOW SHOULD THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION‘S DECISIONS BE
EVALUATED?
By the standards suggested above, the Administration‘s decisions are
incoherent and unprincipled.
The Attorney General‘s letter demonstrates that the Obama
Administration very firmly believes that § 3 is unconstitutional. Mr. Holder
writes:
After careful consideration, including a review of my
recommendation, the President has concluded that given a
number of factors, including a documented history of
discrimination, classifications based on sexual orientation
should be subject to a heightened standard of scrutiny. The
President has also concluded that Section 3 of DOMA, as
applied to legally married same-sex couples, fails to meet
that standard and is therefore unconstitutional.18
Further underscoring the depth of the Administration‘s conviction that
§ 3 is unconstitutional, the Administration‘s position rejects the clear
preponderance of federal appellate opinion on the correct standard of
review. Moreover, the Attorney General also acknowledges that the DOJ is
departing from its ―longstanding practice of defending the constitutionality
of duly-enacted statutes if reasonable arguments can be made in their
defense. . . . This is a rare case where the proper course is to forego the
defense of this statute.‖19
Given the strength of the Administration‘s constitutional convictions
concerning § 3, it is inexcusable for the Administration to continue to
enforce it. None of the justifications the Attorney General puts forward for
continuing enforcement are remotely adequate. To say that enforcement is
―consistent with the Executive‘s obligation to take care that the laws be
faithfully executed‖ is to subordinate the President‘s ―faithful execution‖ of
the Constitution (by his best lights) to the enforcement of § 3. Furthermore,
the statement raises the question of how the President can be ―faithfully
executing‖ the laws if he leaves them undefended against constitutional
challenges.
Equally unpersuasive is the Attorney General‘s claim that a policy of
enforcement ―respects the actions of the prior Congress that enacted
DOMA.‖20 Either those actions demand respect—because they were fully
constitutional—or they do not. If they are unconstitutional, they should be
neither enforced nor defended. Worst of all, however, is the Attorney
18
19
20

Letter to Speaker, supra note 3 (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
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General‘s statement that a policy of nonenforcement ―recognizes the
judiciary as the final arbiter of the constitutional claims raised.‖21 To say
that is to openly abdicate the Executive‘s sworn duty to reach its own,
independent understanding of the Constitution.22
The situation would be different if the Administration could not
decline enforcement of Section 3 without thereby preventing the judiciary
from hearing challenges to it—but the Attorney General does not say that,
and it may not be true. The situation might also be different if the
Administration admitted that although § 3 seemed unconstitutional by its
best lights, the Administration was sufficiently uncertain about that
conclusion to decline to enforce the section. But far from admitting even
some degree of uncertainty about the section‘s unconstitutionality, Mr.
Holder goes to considerable length to stress how certain the Administration
is of its conclusion.
The Administration‘s position rests ultimately on the assumption that it
has discretion whether or not to enforce a statute that it firmly believes to
be unconstitutional. If the argument outlined above is correct, that premise
is simply mistaken. The Administration‘s decision—enforce § 3, but do not
defend it—may make sense, as muddled compromises often do, in raw
political terms. In legal and constitutional terms, it is a hash.

21

Id.
Note also the Attorney General‘s statement that this is a ―rare‖ case in which it is justifiable for
the Executive to depart from the ―longstanding‖ practice of defending Acts of Congress ―if reasonable
arguments can be made in their defense.‖ Id. Contrast Mr. Holder‘s prior advice to Congress in 2009
that he would defend the constitutionality of a bill granting voting representation in the House of
Representatives to the District of Columbia were such a bill enacted. Carrie Johnson, Some in Justice
Department See D.C. Vote in House as Unconstitutional, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Apr. 1, 2009,
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/31/AR2009033104426.html (link). Media
reports at the time stated that in that instance, Mr. Holder had disregarded the advice of his own Office
of Legal Counsel that the bill in question was plainly unconstitutional because the Constitution reserves
voting representation to States, and the District is not and cannot be a State. See, e.g., id. Instead, Mr.
Holder relied on the advice of his Solicitor General‘s Office that the bill was not indefensible in
litigation. See John O. McGinnis, Commentary, An End Run Around the Rule of Law, EXECUTIVE
WATCH, Apr. 6, 2009, http://executivewatch.net/2009/04/06 (link). Mr. Holder is thus in the position of
saying that he would defend the constitutionality of a plainly unconstitutional Act of Congress granting
voting representation to the District of Columbia while not defending an Act of Congress whose
constitutionality had been affirmed by most federal circuits and denied by none. Mr. Holder‘s treatment
of the two situations demonstrates that his constitutional judgments are profoundly politicized.
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